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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
This case illustrates a method by which a defendant may
end up with a judgment under 3211 for which he had not even
moved. If should make plaintiffs aware of a possible pitfall in
moving under 3211(b).
Summary judgment may be granted i a summary proceeding.
The appellate term of the first department has held that a
"summary judgment device is applicable to summary proceedings." 211
The holding arose out of a summary proceeding brought to oust
holdover tenants wherein the landlord moved for summary judg-
ment and to dismiss an affirmative defense. The trial court denied
the motion. The appellate term, in reversing, noted that it had
been generally accepted that the summary proceeding must be
"strictly followed and that there could be no departure from the
mode of trial . . . provided by the statute." 212
The court cited instances in which prior courts had treated a
motion for summary judgment made in a summary proceeding in
different ways so as to achieve a just result. The opinion
continued:
Are we not hypocritical in holding that a motion for summary judgment
is not applicable to a summary proceeding? It would seem that since
the purpose of the summary proceeding is to provide a means for an ex-
peditious determination, anything which will afford even speedier justice
is not opposed to the philosophy of summary proceeding.213
The court noted that there is no justification for making
such a motion unavailable in a summary proceeding. The court
then pointed out that CPLR 3212 permits any party to move for
summary judgment in any action except a matrimonial one. *The
changes made in the transition of Article 83 of the CPA to Article
7 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law were then
cited. Section 1428 of the CPA required a trial by a jury in a
summary proceeding if either party so requested. The new Article
7 of the RPAPL provides a trial only "where triable issues of
fact are raised. .... , 214 Therefore, the court concluded, if there
are no triable issues of fact a summary judgment is proper and
entirely consistent with the purpose of a "summary" proceeding.
The logic of the court's reasoning is unimpeachable. What-
ever distinctions prior law may have made concerning summary
proceedings, there is no justification under the RPAPL or the
CPLR to exclude the summary judgment device from such pro-
211 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 43 Misc. 2d 639,-, 251 N.Y.S.2d
693, 697 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
212 Id. at-, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
213 Id. at-, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
214 RPAPL § 745.
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ceedings. It is, in fact, the most expeditious method, when there
are no genuine fact issues, for concluding any proceeding and
would appear most appropriate of all for a "summary" one.
The court then directed its attention to the second motion made
by the landlord to dismiss an affirmative defense pursuant to
3211(b) of the CPLR. The court stated that the question to be
determined is not whether the pleadings appear to be sufficient,
nor whether they are technically correct, but whether there is
"substance behind the facade." 215 Under CPLR 3211 the court's
inquiry must be directed to whether "the pleader has a claim
or defense rather than whether he has properly stated one." 216
This distinction is an important one for the practitioner. It permits
him to introduce evidence on the motion to determine if the plead-
ing has substance. It makes no difference that it purports on its
face to state a cause of action.
The case is a valuable one in that it establishes, as a simple
proposition, that CPLR 3211 and 3212 are available as procedural
tools to assist in the determination of summary proceedings.
ARTICLE 34- CALENDAR PRACTICE; TRIAL PREFERENCES
Statement of readiness-Even upon consent of both parties,
restoration of a case to the calendar must be at the foot thereof.
In Scully v. Jefferson Truck Renting Corp.2 17 the action was
removed from the calendar for failure to file a timely statement
of readiness. The parties submitted a stipulation consenting to
the placement of the action to its original numerical position on
the trial calendar. The court reinstated the action, but did so
at the foot of the trial calendar. The court held that it has no
authority, regardless of the cause for delay, to return this action
to its original numerical position.218
The statement of readiness is governed by the rules of the
court in the four departments respectively. The rules for the second
department, which the court in the instant case has applied,
are contained in part 7 of the second department court rules and
provide that a negligence action may be placed upon the calendar
without a statement of readiness being filed. However, an action
so filed will be removed from the calendar if the statement is not
filed within one year after the filing of the note of issue. It is
215 Supra note 211, at -, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
2164 WEiNsTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YoRx CIVIL PRACTICE 13211.01
(1964).
21743 Misc. 2d 48, 249 N.Y.S.2d 983 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
218 Scully v. Jefferson Truck Renting Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 48, 52, 249
N.Y.S.2d 983, 987 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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